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WAGE STABILIZATION IN A DEFENSE ECONOMY
By GEORGE W. TAYLOR t
For the second time in a decade, our country has found it necessary
to allocate a large part of its material and human resources to the manu-
facture and operation of armament. What, if anything, should be
done by the government to deal with the economic problems and
maladjustments brought about by such a program? This was the
subject of the great economic debate of 1951 in Congress when the
Defense Production Act was up for renewal. Congress decided that,
as far as direct controls are concerned, a rather loose regulation of
prices and wages would suffice. Subsequent lags in an increasingly
costly armament program, business recession in a number of consumer
goods industries, and continued increases in the cost of living contribute
to considerable dissatisfaction over the answer.
The debate has not been concluded. The control program will
be reexamined in 1952 as the economic consequences of a defense
program become more apparent. Already there is a general and grow-
ing awareness of the fact that the manufacture of armament creates
consumer purchasing power not matched by consumer goods. In-
creased taxes, more savings, and a balanced budget are consequently
urged in the interest of monetary stability. In many ways this so-
called inflationary gap can be more readily understood and dealt
with than can the scarcity problems which are created by a defense
program. Supply and demand relationships, as well as the parallel
wage and price relationships, are distorted when a huge armament
.program is undertaken. Some goods and some services suddenly
become relatively more valuable.
When it became apparent in 1950 that a major defense program
was unavoidable, it was immediately evident that the supply of certain
metals and of certain manufacturing facilities would not be sufficient
to meet all of the increased demand for them for both civilian and de-
fense purposes. In the absence of controls, the scramble for scarce
supplies and for scarce manufacturing facilities not only pushed up
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prices but resulted in the amassing of unusually heavy inventories de-
signed for consumer use. Steel which might have been used to make
tanks went into inventories to support future roller-skate manufacture.
One consequence was heavy high-cost inventories of materials held for
consumer goods manufacture. The cost of defense material was also
boosted until government appropriations, which were ample for de-
fense purposes when made, would not carry the program at all. Costs
of government were thereby increased to an alarming extent.
Since there was not enough of some materials to go around, and
since there was no disposition to curtail consumer standards of living,
it was concluded that the best policy was to eliminate the scarcities.
A gigantic program of plant expansion was undertaken. This, it was
reasoned, would ultimately make it possible to have both "guns and
butter." In typical fashion, another "miracle of production" was
visualized as the way out. But a program of this kind takes a long
time to effectuate. In the meantime it adds to the demand for scarce
raw materials and for scarce manpower. There was an intensification
of the scramble for scarce materials-and for materials which it was
anticipated would be scarce.
Plants and industries contemplating an increased demand for
their products, as well as those planning a great expansion in their
productive facilities, were concerned not only with assuring the nec-
essary raw materials. They also had to have sufficient manpower to
produce the increases of output which were in prospect. Especially
in "defense plants," there were many wage increases. In some in-
stances, managements voluntarily gave wage increases even though
their agreements with labor unions provided firm commitments on
wages for some time to come. They thereby sought to secure for
themselves a preferred position in a tight manpower situation. Other
companies, not directly affected by the defense program, raised their
wages as a defensive measure in order to prevent a loss of employees
needed by them to keep up the civilian production. But a very large
number of wage earners-perhaps as many as 40%-received no wage
increases at all in 1950 even though the cost of living was then moving
steadily higher. Wage relationships previously established between
plants and between industries were badly distorted.
Direct controls over prices and wages were urged by some im-
mediately after the start of hostilities in Korea. Such views were
vigorously opposed on the ground that the problem of "inflation"
must be dealt with by fiscal and monetary devices. That is the typical
approach to the general problem of inflation. Our present problem,
however, is much more specific-it relates not only to inflationary
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pressures in general but to such pressures operating in a defense
economy in which particular material scarcities and particular man-
power scarcities have unusually important significance. Perhaps our
sights have been improperly focused upon "inflation" in general. Our
task could probably be more precisely and more helpfully conceived
in terms of how to deal with the economic consequences of a defense
program.
In retrospect, it seems possible that an early program of direct
controls might have minimized the extent of the scrambling of price
and wage relationships which occurred, especially in 1950. Controls
earlier promulgated might even have prevented the recession in many
consumer goods industries which, beginning about the middle of
1951, followed the speculative piling up of high-cost inventories. In
marked contrast to the defense industries, anticipated scarcities in
most consumer goods did not come about. So, at the close of 1951
our defense economy was characterized by a sizzling boom in the
defense industries but by a recession in many consumer goods in-
dustries.
Whether or not the country would have, at an earlier date, "taken"
direct wage and price controls strong enough to prevent the serious
distortions cannot now be ascertained. At any event, price relation-
ships and wage relationships were badly scrambled by the time the so-
called price and wage freeze order was promulgated in January 1951
by Mr. Eric Johnston, then the Economic Stabilization Administrator.
The purpose of the freeze order has been widely misunderstood.
That order suddenly stopped disorderly movements of prices and
wages which were aggravating both the basic inflationary pressures-
by increasing the cost of armament-and the problem of allocating
resources quickly for the defense program. That was, however, only
the negative aspect of the freeze order. On the positive side, it pro-
vided an opportunity to work out orderly and less speculative move-
ments of prices and of wages.
In a peacetime economy, prices determine the allocation of scarce
goods-the preferred claimant is the one who can and will pay the
highest price. In a defense economy it is determined, not on the basis
of free market forces, that armament needs will be met entirely ir-
respective of cost. So speculative bidding for scarce material can be
disruptive to the defense program and to the national budget. On
the other hand, even in a defense economy, some price increases are
necessary to induce the expansion of productive facilities needed to
overcome the scarcities. Similarly, some wage increases are often
needed in expanding industries to assure sufficient manpower and in
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other industries to eliminate grossly inequitable wage relationships
which retard the attainment of full production.
Against the general background just sketched out, the problem of
wage stabilization can best be understood. When the economic freeze
order was issued in January 1951, wage relationships were badly
awry. During the preceeding year organized employees had received
varying increases depending upon when their labor agreements ex-
pired. Small increases of from 2% to 3% were given early in the year
but the "cost" of settlements steadily increased until, by the end of
the year, the 10% general wage increase was becoming common. Even
larger adjustments were made under some voluntary reopenings of
wage agreements. In contrast, large numbers of employees, especially
so-called white collar workers and unorganized employees, had re-
ceived no wage increases at all in 1950 despite the rise in living costs.
A rigid freeze of these distorted relationships would not only have
been capricious and inequitable but would have seriously interferred
with employee morale and with the maximum production of needed
goods. If this judgment is correct, an arbitrary freeze would have
aggravated inflation to the extent of production lost because of em-
ployee dissatisfaction stemming from just complaints. The task of
the Wage Stabilization Board, at least to begin with, involved the
substitution of orderly wage movements for disorderly ones. The first
phase of this work involved the approval of certain wage adjustments
deemed necessary to unscramble the distort-ions which had been created
in the post-Korea speculation. To attain this objective, three major
kinds of wage adjustments were approved by the Board through is-
suance of General Regulation No. 6. They were:
1. The 10% catch-up allowance. Groups of employees which
had not received so much as a total 10% general wage increase since
January 15, 1950, could be "made up" to that figure without specific
or prior approval. This was to permit wage laggards to catch up
with the increasing cost-of-living and with the earnings of employees
whose wages were in the vanguard of the upward wage movement
started by the defense program. Only if a larger wage adjustment was
sought by an employer, operating with or without a union, would it
be necessary to secure the approval of the Wage Stabilization Board.
Every case specifically considered by the Board thus involved an em-
ployer request to pay wages in excess of the 10% limit. And, of course,
,every case approved by the Board brought wages in excess of the same
limit.
Despite these considerations, the 10% limitation was widely
looked upon as a "ceiling." Every Board approval of a request to
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increase wages in a specific case was commonly evaluated as a "pierc-
ing of the ceiling." Perhaps the reason for this incongruity lies in
the distortion of wage relationship already referred to. The 10%
"limitation" was considered to be "tough" for those employees whose
wages led the upward movement. They were "entitled" to no further
general adjustments. On the other hand, the same rule doubtless
seemed generous indeed to those numerous employers whose workers
had received no wage increases at all since January 1950. The idea
that wage increases even greater than 10% might be available under
the stabilization program did not enter their minds. At any event,
the extent of misunderstanding about the 10% limit as actually pro-
mulgated was a notable aspect of the effort to introduce a wage
stabilization program in 1951.
2. Base-date abnormality. The so-called 10% catch-up allow-
ance was devised on these two assumptions: (a) wage-rate relation-
ships between plants and industries were generally on a stabilized
basis in January 1950; and (b) if increases up to a total of 10%
over January 1950 were permitted, the maladjustments created by
the post-Korean changes in wage-rate relationships would be largely
eliminated. These assumptions were, in large measure, supported by
the facts. But there were some exceptions which had to be provided
for. In some industries and in some plants, the wage-rates paid in
January 1950 were abnormal because of unusual local circumstances.
The shipbuilding industry, for example, was not like most industries
in early 1950 because it had previously gone through a severe con-
traction of business. This was reflected in its relatively low wage-
rates as compared with other heavy industries. A 10% wage increase
over rates paid in January 1950 would continue a wage relationship
which reflected depressed conditions. The shipbuilding industry re-
quested a 15% make-up allowance in 1951 in order to establish a
stabilized relationship between its wage-rates and those of other related
industries. This request, made at a time when the industry's orders
started to move upward, was approved by the Wage Stabilization
Board because of the base date abnormality just referred to. That
is, the use of the generally applicable base date for shipbuilding wage-
rates would not provide a stabilized relationship with other industries.
In other words, the larger wage increase was called for in order to
insure that the industry would have the manpower necessary to meet
the demands of the defense program upon it. There were relatively
few cases involving "base-date abnormality" but they were important
ones.
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3. Tandem allowances. Wage adjustments could not be limited
to 10%, over those prevailing on January 15, 1950, in still another
type of situation. There were numerous cases where, just prior to
the freeze, wage increases of say 15% had been legally given to em-
ployees in one department of a company but not to those in another
department. Usually, the production workers had gotten the wage
increase and the white-collar workers had not. Or the employees of
one company, which had the position of a wage-leader in an area
or an industry, benefited by a 12Y2 % wage increase while those of
another company, the wage-follower, were "caught by the freeze."
Immediately following the freeze, managements who were "caught"
with this problem became fearful lest the consequent loss of manpower
or of employee morale would impair the efficiency of their operations.
They insisted upon the essentiality of wage adjustments to reinstitute
established wage relationships.
It was then provided, under wage stabilization rules, that where
wages for two groups of employees had long moved together in tandem
fashion, and where such a long-established relationship had been dis-
turbed by the wage freeze, wage increases totaling more than 10%
since January 15, 1950, could be given to the extent necessary to re-
institute the stabilized relationships. Unlike the "base-date abnor-
mality," the "tandem allowances" provided for a very large number
of wage increases. If one emphasized solely the need to restrict pur-
chasing power, those increases could not be readily justified. But
there would be a heavy cost in so limiting purchasing power. Labor
turnover, lower production, and less efficient operations would have
resulted. In addition, the perpetuation of basic inequities would have
impaired everyone's confidence in the economic control program.
Because of the great disordering of wage-rate relationships sub-
sequent to the Korean incident, then, a significant volume of wage
increases had to be contemplated as necessary to get the wage stabiliza-
tion program under way. Even so, the increases which became ap-
provable under the wage stabilization program were unquestionably
less than would have been made under a continuance of the speculative
movement that had previously prevailed. Nor is it illogical to expect
that, in the absence of controls, the distortion of wage relationships
would have become more pronounced. Indeed, the wages made per-
missible under the stabilization program served to straighten out some
of the distortions created earlier. The general 10% allowance over
the January 15, 1950, base, for example, was in the direction of keep-
ing real wages of unorganized workers and of white-collar employees
in reasonable relationship with organized employees. The tandem al-
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lowances were to avoid perpetuation of artificial and inequitable rela-
tionships resulting from the sudden freeze which prevented a normal
working out of wage movements already well under way at the time
of the freeze. In a few cases, such as shipbuilding, a catch-up allow-
ance of more than 10% was necessary because of unusual conditions
in an industry prevailing as of the general base date of January 15,
1950.
PRESERVING BASIC WAGE-DETERMINING FACTORS
The above three basic wage regulations looked backward. Their
main purpose was to unravel a tangled web of wage relationships that
was brought about, in the absence of controls, subsequent to the Korean
incident. Only after attention to the straightening-out process was
it possible to consider policies to govern further changes in wages
in response to changing economic conditions.
In evaluating this second phase of the wage stabilization program,
there is a disposition in some quarters to look upon wages solely as
purchasing power. Increased wages do provide more purchasing power
and wage increases do contribute to inflationary pressures. This factor
is important but it is not all-important. Wages are more than
purchasing power. They have other functions to perform. Wages
affect the flow of manpower and provide incentives having much to
do with the levels of production and of productivity which are attained.
Devising wage stabilization rules is thus no simple undertaking. Var-
ious needs have to be balanced. This was specifically recognized by
Congress in the Defense Production Act. Congress there provided
for a program of wage stabilization which would not merely seek to
minimize inflationary pressures but would also not interfere with de-
fense production or with stable industrial relations and would preserve
collective bargaining. The last mentioned consideration has not been
fully perceived or understood.
When wages are to be determined in conformance with rules
making up a national stabilization program, there is a fundamental in-
terference with collective bargaining. Under collective bargaining as
operated in the United States there is only one way to determine wages
-by an agreement between a management and a union. These parties
have a right, which is also a responsibility, to devise for themselves
those terms of employment at which they will work together. Under
such a system, and despite its many shortcomings, most of us believe
that workers and management are more free, and more productive, than
when employment terms are established by the government.
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So deep is our conviction about the need for agreement between
labor and management that the right to strike is readily approved in
principle and, with grumbling and sometimes apprehension, even sup-
ported despite inconvenient interruptions of production. The strike
is a vital part of the agreement-making process because it is the ul-
timate means for inducing disputants to modify extreme positions
to the extent necessary to bring about a meeting of minds. If the
strike were eliminated, some other means for resolving the underlying
conflict about employment terms would have to be invented. Since
the strike has its own particular conflict characteristics, to many it
doubtless seems anomalous to appraise the strike fundamentally as a
method for resolving conflict. That is because collective bargaining
is a complex institution.
An attempt is presently being made to stabilize wages even though
the right to strike is retained by employees. This one fact stands out
as the most significant factor in the current wage stabilization equa-
tion. It should be noted that the conditions for effectuating wage
stabilization are now quite different than those which prevailed dur-
ing World War II. A reasonably effective no-strike no-lockout policy
was then operative.
Two different sets of criteria for determining wages are presently
in use. On the one hand is the criterion of what wages are necessary
to avoid or to terminate a strike. On the other hand is the criterion
of what is permissible under wage stabilization rules. There is in-
congruity in this situation. Employees who believe strongly that they
are equitably entitled to more than is obtainable under wage stabiliza-
tion rules may resort to the strike action to achieve their goals. Be-
cause of the pressure of strike-or the threat of strike-an employer
may feel impelled to agree to a larger wage increase than is allowable
under the rules. It is entirely understandable why a company may not
be enthusiastic about taking a strike to support a wage stabilization
policy. After all, the company is rather on its own in avoiding a
strike or terminating one. To be sure, any agreement as to wages is
subject to approval of the Wage Stabilization Board. But a veto of
the agreement creates a serious possibility that industrial relations
will be unstabilized.
There can be no doubt at all about the unusual difficulty of de-
veloping and of effectuating a national wage stabilization program
at the same time that the right to strike is retained by employees. The
dilemma becomes more difficult to resolve in the absence of a "strong"
stabilization program in other economic areas. Even so, it does not
follow that we should now proceed to enact legislation for a no-strike
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policy in order to support the wage stabilization endeavor. As already
noted, in collective bargaining the strike is the ultimate method for
resolving a dispute over the terms of employment. Elimination of the
strike method would require the substitution of another method which
would, in all liklihood, have to be some form of arbitration. Without
a voluntary no-strike no-lockout agreement, the substitute method
would have to be some form of compulsory arbitration. World War II
experience shows that an all-embracive no-strike policy, even when
voluntarily adopted by labor, results in the establishment of a board or
agency having a rather all-inclusive jurisdiction. Any matter de-
terminable by strike becomes subject to board decision. In other
words, the power of the board to decide is as broad as the power of a
union and a management to agree. We seek an adequate defense of
our democratic institutions. It would be incongruous to jettison an
important one-collective bargaining-at the very outset of the defense
endeavor and to substitute a method-for determining wages more com-
patible to the ideology we find obnoxious.
Under these circumstances, the tripartite composition of the Wage
Stabilization Board is of paramount importance. Out of the delibera-
tions of the representatives of the labor, industry and public interests
should ideally come a wage stabilization program not only acceptable
to labor and management but with a proper protection of the public
interest. At times like the present, the public interest in the terms of
employment is greater than in less troublesome periods and should re-
ceive greater recognition in the wage-determining process. Yet it
would be a drastic scuttling of collective bargaining values to deny all
participation to representatives of labor and of management. That
would be 6e result of having a wage stabilization board composed
entirely of public representatives. A board of that composition could
function, moreover, only if there were no right to strike. Yet the
absence of labor participation would, in itself, create pressures for
striking against imposed decisions.
There is the possibility that a wage stabilization program created
and administered by a tripartite board would have such status that
this very process would, in view of the emergency needs of the country,
be accepted as a substitute for the strike. Should this come about, there
would be an implicit but limited no-strike policy. That would be
tantamount to a voluntary reliquishment of the use of economic power
to determine wages and a voluntary acceptance of the wage stabiliza-
tion rules. The ideal goal has just been spelled out although such an
objective is not likely to be perfectly achieved. Perhaps a reasonable
approximation, which will suffice, could be developed. At any event,
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building up a wage stabilization program while the right to strike
is retained should be looked upon as a significant challenge to demo-
cratic processes. The degree of success of the economic control pro-
gram upon which we have embarked depends, in no small measure,
upon how that challenge is met.
In these terms, of prime importance is the soundness of the stabili-
zation rules set up to govern future wage changes in response to the
changing economic factors which accompany a defense program. Such
rules must not only meet the needs of the general public for protection
against the threat of inflation, but they must also commend themselves
both to employees and to employers as workable and equitable. These
general specifications are rigorous indeed. So is the task of working
out the specific details. The complexities are magnified by the nec-
essity of integrating wage stabilization into an overall control program
in which relatively equal restraints are imposed upon the various
economic segments of the economy. This involves the so-called equality
of sacrifice principle. Each segment takes the position that the prin-
ciple has been overlooked in the controls applicable to it.
CONTROL RULES FOR THE FUTURE
The details of a wage stabilization program must be worked out
against the general setting just referred to. In devising those details,
one must recognize that any wage stabilization program introduces
controls only over the basic wage-rate schedule-the schedule of hourly
wages and of incentive rates in a plant. If production increases under
a piece-work schedule, so will hourly earnings. Hourly wage-rates
cannot be adjusted upward or downward depending upon the number
of hours worked in a week or in a year. The general availability of
overtime to employees, however, may sometimes result in a relatively
"tight" control over hourly earnings as was the case during World
War II. But, fundamentally, wage stabilization rules concern wage-
rates and not earnings or take-home pay.
As a matter of fact, in a defense economy, the total national wage
bill tends to rise much faster than increases in basic wage-rate schedules.
Longer hours are worked, sometimes at premium rates. More people
are employed. Because expanded production is needed there, a larger
proportion of all employees secure employment in "defense plants"
where wage-rates are relatively high. Within the individual company
more "merit increases" and "promotions" are given as manpower be-
comes more scarce. These factors, and others like them, insure an
increasing national wage bill in a defense economy. They add to the
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gap between civilian purchasing power and civilian goods. Nor can
stabilization rules meet that problem, because wage controls are de-
terminable principally as respects wage-rates.
Wage-Rates and the Cost-of-Living. Creation of a sound wage
stabilization program thus entails primary attention to wage-rates.
First of all, regulations must be promulgated to deal with the general
level of wage-rates. Central to the determination of such regulations
is a consideration of tying in changes of wage-rates with changes in
the cost-of-living as reflected by indices of consumer goods prices.
Increases in living costs depreciate the value of the wages received for
an hour of labor. Such a factor is of general influence. Rapid in-
creases in living costs can, thus, result in a reduced standard of living
for all employees unless overtime, upgrading, etc., provide compensat-
ing earnings to keep the weekly wage on a par with increasing living
costs. Traveling that route means requesting harder work and more
responsibilities of wage earners to maintain their attained standards
of living.
In the present defense economy, and because of circumstances
already noted, the tripartite Wage Stabilization Board unanimously
decided, through issuance of its Revised General Regulation No. 8, that,
as a general proposition, wage-rate increases proportionate to increases
in the cost-of-living should be approvable. Severe criticisms have been
directed against this policy. It has been called a device of "built-in
inflation." Some wage increases, which are to be permitted to match
cost-of-living increases, will doubtless result in higher prices and in a
consequent upward movement in the cost-of-living. There is a danger
of such an "inflation spiral." On the other hand, it cannot possibly
be assumed that the upward movement of prices would be stopped
merely by a more rigid wage policy in the absence of much more rigid
restrictions on the prices of farm products and of manufactured goods.
There would be, moreover, little survival possibility of a wage stabili-
zation program conceived with virtual certainty that, under it, the
employees' standards of living would steadily depreciate. Such an
"austerity program" for labor would, moreover, not be equitable in
relation to the existing policies governing prices of farm products and
of manufactured goods. The "equality of sacrifice" principle is difficult
to effectuate but nonetheless important.
It has been urged, further, that the linking of wage-rates with
changes in the cost-of-living is no stabilization program at all. Such
a position is without merit. There cannot be the slightest doubt that
wage-rate increases greater than the increases in living costs would be
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the result of collective bargaining, including the right to strike, in many
defense industries. The larger wage increase would not result in a loss
of sales or in any loss of employment. In other words, the economic
power of unions in such industries is high. The economic power of
the manufacturer in the sale of his products is likewise high.
A critical test of the stabilization program will be over the will-
ingness of employees substantially to restrict general wage-rate in-
creases to such an amount as will maintain real wage-rates. This
would mean, in essence, that the general wage-rate level would provide
for no improvement in real hourly wage-rates during the defense
emergency period. On the ground that other groups in the economy
have secured "a better break" than this, the wage stabilization program
has been challenged by labor union representatives as being "too tough"
and as a deviation from the principle of "equality of sacrifice." In
this connection, however, one cannot lose sight of the fact that many
wage earners, unorganized or having a lesser economic power, may
not be able to keep their wage-rates in line with increased costs-of-
living. This means that, in a defense period, there may not be an
"equality of sacrifice" among those in a particular segment of the
economy. Much the same kind of disparity exists in the pricing of
farm products or of manufactured goods since demand for each product
does not increase evenly.
As far as wages are concerned, the reluctance of organized labor
to accept a rigid "cost-of-living formula," has resulted in a focusing
of attention upon the so-called productivity factor. If wage-rates,
and earnings, increase at a time when productivity increases propor-
tionately, the result is not inflationary. This is easily perceived under
a piece-rate system of wage payment where the size of the pay check
depends upon the output. Productivity can also increase when em-
ployees are paid by the hour. In such cases, the "productivity factor"
is taken into account when wages are being negotiated for a new labor
agreement. A wage increase truly based upon productivity will not
increase costs and should not necessitate any price adjustment. There
are strong reasons for developing a productivity factor allowance
in the wage stabilization program, particularly if the understandable
desire of particular employees .to improve their living standards can,
in reality, be met without an increase of inflationary pressures. In
this area, it seems to me, lies the greatest opportunity for ploughing
new ground in the current wage stabilization endeavor.
Inter-Plant Wage Relationships. Even though a "cost-of-living"
formula secures general acceptance as the basic wage stabilization rule,
1952] WAGE STABILIZATION IN A DEFENSE ECONOMY 511
there are many cases, usually involving small companies, in which ad-
ditional wage increases must be provided if the needs of the defense
program are to be met. The most important situation in this category
is the so-called "inter-plant inequity."
Claims relating to this "inequity" account for by far the largest
number of cases whicl must be handled by any wage stabilization
agency. The pressure for these wage adjustments arises out of the
observed economic tendency for the wage levels of different companies
in the same labor market area to narrow as manpower becomes tighter.
A company impelled to pay low wages during a period of relatively
stiff competition, seeks to improve its relative wage position in the
labor market area when it is able to do so and when employees are more
difficult to acquire or to retain. The case typically arises as a request
of a small-size or medium-size employer in an area to raise wages
"more nearly up to the level of" a designated large company in the
same community. Usually there is a complaint from the smaller
manufacturer that he is losing employees to the larger neighbor. And,
"is it the policy of the government to discriminate against small em-
ployers ?" Provision has to be made to permit some upward movement
in the schedules of the lowest wage companies not only to avoid "dis-
crimination" but to permit the production facilities of all companies
to be fully utilized. Otherwise, the lowest wage concerns would not
be able to man their production facilities.
A rule for the sound control of inter-plant wage movements is
extremely difficult to formulate and to administer. To begin with,
there are some historical differences in the wages paid by various
concerns in the same labor market which cannot be disturbed without
unstabilizing consequences. They have been termed "stabilized dif-
ferentials." It is necessary to distinguish between them and the inter-
plant differences which are affected by the changed economic conditions
brought about by the defense program. During World War II, the
essence of the inter-plant wage inequity rule which evolved was: wages
which are more than 10% below the average wage paid in the com-
munity for a certain job may be increased to a point approximately
10% below the average. But the manpower problem was then quite
different than under the present defense economy. Present rules prop-
erly provide for the exercise of considerably more judgment in dealing
with inter-plant inequity cases.
Intra-Plant Wage Relationships. Wages have a direct effect
upon employee morale and upon productivity. In this particular,
probably the most important matter concerns the question of whether
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or not, within the same plant, the wages paid various employees are
proportionate to the skill, effort and responsibility required in the per-
formance of the jobs. Experience during World War II showed
convincingly that most of the so-called wild-cat strikes which occur
in an emergency period stem from alleged intra-plant wage-rate in-
equities. Employees cannot understand why they should be required to
do a harder job for less money than their fellows "in the next depart-
ment." A considerable progress has been made in recent years in de-
veloping internally "balanced wage-rate structures" in American in-
dustry. But, for many reasons, maladjustments come about. Any
wage stabilization program must include provision for their correction
unless a serious hindrance to full production is to be induced.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In stabilizing wages in the defense economy which now pre-
vails, the first task was to "wind up" the disorderly movement which
typified the immediate post-Korean period. This task was undertaken
by the allowance of general wage-rate increases totaling 107 since
January 15, 1950, by the base-date abnormality provision, and by the
so-called tandem regulation. This was the "looking backward" phase.
Then came the "looking ahead" phase of determining the basis for
future adjustments of wage rates in response to changing economic
conditions brought about by the defense program. The basic in-
gredients of this part of the wage stabilization program are allowances
for wage adjustments to compensate for increases in the cost-of-living.
to eliminate so-called inter-plant inequities, and to eliminate so-called
intra-plant inequities.
Although the three control rules "for the future" as just em-
phasized constitute the basic framework, it is not suggested that they
are all that is needed. Rules must also be evolved to place limits upon
other wage adjustments which are commonly made. They include
wage increases for increased productivity, the various collateral wage
issues, i.e., "fringe items" like paid vacations, holiday pay and the like,
as well as pension and health provisions. In general, the tendency
in constituting wage stabilization rules is to allow "laggards" to catch
up to widely established area and industry practices.
Even this cursory examination of some of the problems involved
in developing a wage stabilization program in the defense economy in-
dicates the complexity of the undertaking. There is a disposition in
some quarters to believe that mere firmness or inflexibility is all that
is needed to stabilize wages. Were that the case, the problem would,
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indeed, be an easy one. The answer is just not so simple. Toughness
and inflexibility are not likely to serve as satisfactory substitutes for
intelligence.
As long as labor's right to strike is preserved and as long as man-
agement is to be free in the operation of its plant, a wage stabilization
policy must at least be acquiesced in by organized labor and by manage-
ment. Any wage stabilization program, moreover, must be flexible if
the matter of fair treatment to employees, organized and unorganized, is
looked upon as important. The "fair treatment" criterion cannot be
entirely brushed aside in our kind of a democracy. Provision must
be made for those wage adjustments which, in the absence of a directed
labor force, must be depended upon to help in allocating manpower re-
sources so as to meet defense production requirements. Further, wage
controls should not impede the production of goods-especially those
needed for the national defense.
There are thus limits to the kind of wage controls which can be
applied in a democracy such as ours. For, there may be an oppres-
sively heavy "cost tag" attached to very strict controls under which
the terms of employment are imposed by the government. Loss of
the very democratic principles we are seeking to defend would be a
poor start toward the defense of freedom. In a defense economy--
short of extensive hostilities-wage stabilization clearly involves a
careful balancing of values so that inflationary forces may be minimized
without the abandonment of other vital objectives.
